Epaminondas (c. 410-362 B.C.)



Theban statesman and military tactician and leader who was largely responsible for breaking the military dominance of Sparta and for altering permanently the balance of power among the Greek states. He defeated a Spartan army at Leutra (371 BC) and led successful expeditions into the Peloponnese (370­369, 369­368, 367, and 362), being killed in battle during the last of those invasions.

Epaminondas was the son of a Theban aristocrat. His father, though poor, provided him with a good education. Particularly attracted to philosophy, the boy became a devoted pupil of Lysis of Tarentum, a Pythagorean, who had settled in Thebes. Epaminondas did not at first take any part in political life but served on military expeditions. There is a legend that he saved the life of his colleague Pelopidas in battle in 385.

In 382 the Spartans took advantage of an expedition to northern Greece to conspire with a few Thebans and seize power by a sudden coup. For three and a half years the government was in the hands of this small dictatorship, backed by a Spartan garrison in the Cadmeia (the citadel of Thebes). Many of the previous leaders, including Pelopidas, were driven into exile. Epaminondas remained in private life, but when Pelopidas, returning secretly from Athens, successfully overthrew the dictatorship in 379 and frightened the Spartan garrison into surrender, Epaminondas is said to have been one of those who led the popular uprising in Thebes. No individual part is attributed to him for the next eight years, during which Thebes, in alliance with Athens, successfully fought off Sparta and reestablished its traditional leadership in a federation of the cities of Boeotia. In 371 the general war was ended at a peace conference, but Sparta and Athens combined to refuse recognition to the Theban federation by insisting that each city of Boeotia should be a separate party to the treaty, while Thebes claimed that its federation should be treated as a single unit. Epaminondas, who was boeotarch (one of the five magistrates of the federation), maintained this position, even when it led to the exclusion of Thebes from the peace treaty. The Spartans had an army stationed on Thebes's western frontier, waiting to follow up their diplomatic success by a crushing military attack. But in the Battle of Leuctra (371) Epaminondas was ready with a tactical innovation. Instead of the usual advances of heavily armed infantry drawn up in an equal number of ranks over the whole front, he massed his troops on the left wing to the unprecedented depth of 50 ranks against an overall Spartan depth of 12. The Spartans, who according to Greek convention had their best troops on the right wing, were overwhelmed by the force of the Theban advance. The novelty consisted in striking the enemy first at their strongest, instead of their weakest, point, with such crushing force that the attack was irresistible. The defeat of the Spartans inflicted such heavy losses on the very limited numbers of the Spartan soldiers that it seriously threatened the possibility of raising another Spartan army. The Boeotian federation had been saved, and after more than a year the Theban army, once more led by Epaminondas, proceeded to press home its victory. In the winter (a most unusual season for Greek warfare) of 370­369 they invaded the Peloponnese and penetrated the valley of the Eurotas (modern Evrótas). For the first time for at least two centuries an enemy army was in sight of Sparta. The subject population of Helots revolted, and Epaminondas re-created the state of Messenia, which had been enslaved by the Spartans for 300 years. He also encouraged the Arcadians, who had broken from Sparta's league, to found Megalopolis (Big City) as a federal capital. These new political creations served to keep Sparta in check so that it was never again a serious military power outside the Peloponnese. Epaminondas' brilliant success was met with jealousy and political opposition at home. He had stayed abroad over his year of office and was impeached on his return but acquitted. In 369­368 he led a second successful invasion of the Peloponnese, gaining further allies for Boeotia. In 367 he also served as a common soldier in an army sent to rescue his friend Pelopidas, who was a prisoner of Alexander, tyrant of Pherae (Thessaly). The expedition got into difficulties from which it was only rescued when Epaminondas was appointed general. This resulted in his reelection as boeotarch. He then returned to Thessaly and secured the release of Pelopidas. In 366 he invaded the Peloponnese for a third time, with a view to strengthening the Theban position there. He obtained assurances of fidelity from several states and, perhaps because of these assurances, decided not to overthrow the oligarchical governments that had been established by the Spartans. This was not accepted by the Theban government, which was in favour of overthrowing the oligarchs and establishing new democracies.

Athens had supported Sparta and was at war with Thebes. In 364­363 Epaminondas made a bold attempt to challenge Athens' naval empire. With a new Boeotian fleet, he sailed to Byzantium, with the result that a number of cities in the Athenian Empire rebelled against their now-threatened masters. But the next year the outbreak of civil war in the Arcadian league brought Epaminondas once more to the head of a large allied army in the Peloponnese. He was met by Sparta, Athens, and their allies in the Battle of Mantineia (362). Epaminondas repeated on a large scale the tactics of Leuctra and was once more victorious but died of a wound on the field of battle. With his death all constructive initiative appeared to vanish from Theban policy. (Encyclopædia Britannica Online.)

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A Theban statesman and soldier, son of Polymnis, and in whose praise, for both talents and rectitude, there is a remarkable concurrence of ancient writers. Nepos observes that before Epaminondas was born and after his death Thebes was always in subjection to some other power; while he directed her councils she was at the head of Greece. His public life extends from the restoration of democracy by Pelopidas and the other exiles, B.C. 379, to the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. In the conspiracy by which that revolution was effected he took no part, but thenceforward he became the prime mover of the Theban State. His policy was first directed to assert the right and to secure the power to Thebes of controlling the other cities of Boeotia, several of which claimed to be independent. In this cause he ventured to engage his country, single-handed, in war with the Spartans, who marched into Boeotia, B.C. 371, with a force superior to any which could be brought against them. The Theban generals were divided in opinion whether a battle should be risked, for to encounter the Lacedaemonians with inferior numbers was universally esteemed hopeless. Epaminondas prevailed upon his colleagues to venture it, and devised on this occasion a new method of attack. Instead of joining battle along the whole line he concentrated an overwhelming force on one point, directing the weaker part of his line to keep back. The Spartan right being broken and their king slain, the rest of the army found it necessary to abandon the field. This memorable battle was fought at Leuctra (B.C. 371). The moral effect of it was much more important than the mere loss inflicted upon Sparta, for it overthrew the prescriptive superiority in arms claimed by that State ever since its reformation by Lycurgus.

This brilliant success led Epaminondas to the second object of his policy, the overthrow of the supremacy of Sparta and the substitution of Thebes as the leader of Greece in the democratic interest. In this hope a Theban army, under his command, marched into the Peloponnesus early in the winter, B.C. 369, and, in conjunction with the Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, invaded and laid waste a large part of Laconia. Numbers of the Helots took that opportunity to shake off a most oppressive slavery; and Epaminondas struck a deadly blow at the power of Sparta by establishing these descendants of the old Messenians on Mount Ithomé in Messenia, as an independent State, and inviting their countrymen, scattered through Italy and Sicily, to return to their ancient patrimony. Numbers obeyed the call. This memorable event is known in history as the return of the Messenians, and two hundred years had elapsed since their expulsion. In B.C. 368, Epaminondas again led an army into the Peloponnesus; but, not fulfilling the expectations of the people, he was disgraced and, according to Diodorus (xv. 71), was ordered to serve in the ranks: In that capacity he is said to have saved the army in Thessaly when entangled in dangers which threatened it with destruction, being required by the general voice to assume the command. He is not again heard of in a public capacity till B.C. 366, when he was sent to support the democratic interest in Achaia, and by his moderation and judgment brought that whole confederation over to the Theban alliance without bloodshed or banishment. It soon became plain, however, that a mere change of masters--Thebes instead of Sparta--would be of no service to the Grecian States. Achaia first, then Elis, then Mantinea and a great part of Arcadia, returned to the Lacedaemonian alliance. To check this defection, Epaminondas led an army into the Peloponnesus for the fourth time, in B.C. 362. Joined by the Argives, Messenians, and part of the Arcadians, he entered Laconia and endeavoured to take Sparta by surprise; but the vigilance of Agesilaüs just frustrated his scheme. Epaminondas then marched against Mantinea, near which was fought the celebrated battle in which he fell. The disposition of his troops on this occasion was an improvement on that by which he had gained the battle of Leuctra, and would have had the same decisive success, but that, in the critical moment, when the Lacedaemonian line was just broken, he received a mortal wound, said to have been inflicted by Gryllus, the son of Xenophon. The Theban army was paralyzed by this misfortune; nothing was done to profit by a victory which might have been made certain; and this battle, on which the expectation of all Greece waited, led to no important result.

Whether Epaminondas could much longer have upheld Thebes in the rank to which he had raised her is very doubtful; without him she fell at once to her former obscurity. His character is certainly one of the noblest recorded in Greek history. His private life was moral and refined, his public conduct uninfluenced by personal ambition or by personal hatred. He was a sincere lover of his country; and if, in his schemes for her advancement, he was indifferent to the injury done to other members of the Grecian family, this is a fault from which, perhaps, no Greek statesman except Aristides was free. His life was written in Latin by Cornelius Nepos; and in recent times in German by Bauch (1834) and Pomtow (1870). See also Sankey, Spartan and Theban Supremacies (London, 1877). (Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities, 1898)